Louisiana Law Review
Volume 64
Number 4 Normalization of National Security
Law: A Symposium
Summer 2004

Article 4

8-1-2004

FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive Nexus Between Public
Access and Terrorist Attack
James T. O'Reilly

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
James T. O'Reilly, FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive Nexus Between Public Access and Terrorist
Attack, 64 La. L. Rev. (2004)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol64/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

FOIA and Fighting Terror: The Elusive Nexus
Between Public Access and Terrorist Attack
James T. O'Reilly*
I. INTRODUCTION

How much should our society change to fight terrorism and still
maintain our traditions and rights? Information is power, and less
information is flowing out of government as more information has
been flowing in. Is this a serious trend or a misperception? In my
corner of administrative law, amid the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and privacy legislation aficionados, there is a raging storm of
contrary opinions that surfaces whenever our small band of
disclosure advocates gets together, and we (being lawyers) cannot
agree.
Picture the television commercials of cars with crash dummies
hitting a wall. Our open society went suddenly from a trend of
"everyone should get everything online that they ever could want to
know" to the rapid deceleration-the slowdown of disclosure-that
marks the foreseeable future response to Al Queda. The change is
the brutal awakening to a new opponent seeking martyrdom, who
was in Florida libraries and was downloading United States
government website files. The enemy using our federal agencies' web
disclosures is no longer a slow-moving, monolithic Kremlin seeking
missile technology secrets with agents who can be pinpointed and
sometimes offered asylum to switch to our side. The adversary is a
mass movement of technically well-educated and very dedicated
small cells of attackers using the internet, the library, and the news
sources of the twenty-first century. Their goal is no longer to defend
a land mass and a particular politburo. Rather, their goal is to use
their martyrdom to force westerners into submission to a theocratic
Taliban-like state, run on eighth century norms of societal
subjugation. Suddenly, we are the infidels; we are the target of a sixfoot five-inch Saudi millionaire with a masters in civil engineering
and a devoted cadre of highly motivated and literate followers.
As the game has changed, the rules are changing. This paper
represents a snapshot of that change as it relates to information
exchange and disclosure. This paper proposes that we recognize that
the retreat from pro-disclosure openness is underway; that the voters
are tolerant, if not fully supportive, of federal secrecy; and that we
should look to a new form of administrative surrogates for the
resolution of disclosure disputes between government and citizens.
*
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11. BACKGROUND OF STATUTORY DISCLOSURE SYSTEMS

The FOIA1 disclosure system was created between 1961 and 1964,
and was premised on a "retail" style, one request at a time, disclosure
system. The "wholesale" aspect of disclosure had already been required
in the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act,2 which had required all rules
to be published. What was new about the 1966 FOIA3 was its novel
permission to individuals to obtain agency records on request unless one
of nine exemptions 4 applied. The FOIA ideal was that "any person"
could have access without explaining why.' During the development of
the Act, the primary movers were the American Society of Newspaper
Editors.6 They considered having language that would give extra access
rights for reporters or the media, but settled on the less objectionable
view that all requesters of whatever background should be the
democratically ideal audience for government information.
The first of several myths, which I call the "FOIA Fictions," was
that any average person would be using the disclosure statute. The next
twenty years showed that average users were not journalists or common
citizens. It may be speculated (in the absence of a centralized statistical
database report) who the FOIA users have been. It is my observation
that convicted criminals in federal prisons and their defense counsel have
been the largest identifiable class of requesters. These user statistics
seem to be followed closely by requests from agents of corporations
which opposed regulators, or argued about federal contract denials, or
who wanted to study the competitors' application for a government
license or approval. The third largest requesters may have been the
Washington based advocacy groups, whose selective use of federal
documents to blast federal agencies has frankly scared some agency
employees out of using written advocacy for controversial proposals or
innovative policy proposals. Fourth on the list may have been trade
press and specialized news service reporters seeking insider information
for publication to their insider audiences. A distant fifth or sixth were
general journalists, and far back in the pack were average citizens who,
for individual reasons, wanted to have some knowledge of a certain
government program.7
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2004).
2. Pub. L. No. 79-404,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), amendedby Pub. L. No. 89-554,
80 Stat. 383 (1966).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2004).
5. Id. § 552(a)(2).
6. This history is explained at length in 1 James T. O'Reilly, Federal
Information Disclosure ch. 2 (3d ed. Supp. 2004).
7. This approximation of gross volume is necessarily subjective and
speculative in the absence of a central source of user identities, and it omits the
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What could this "any person" do with the records? Anything!
The FOIA did not care. Indeed, it aggressively declined to consider
motives of the first requester,8 because once the record is released to
any person, it is deemed no longer subject to an exemption from
required disclosure. 9 An alleged terrorist could, and indeed, has sued
for FOIA access to federal investigations of his work."° This
blindness to motives was a conscious policy response against the
perceived evils of selectivity in disclosure. The press had been
denied more than selective, "leaked" records access in the 1950s,"
so the press endorsed very un-selective access in the FOIA in the
early 1960s. At the time, that was an understandable policy choice
for the advocates of an openness proposal. The policy of "disclose
to one, disclose to all" has continued for decades since, as a
fundamental assumption of FOIA with rare exceptions.12
Il.

TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECTS OF THE INTERNET

What effect did the Internet have? In those glorious days of
peace and harmony around 1996, when the most recent FOIA
amendments were being adopted, 3 the emphasis was on pushing out
the maximum set of records at maximum speed and with minimal
transaction costs and minimal delays.' 4 The Internet magnified the
consequence of disclosure, from one person getting one sheet of
paper, to millions of potential users world-wide downloading data
and diagrams. We were naive, and we assumed all consequences of
disclosure were good. Parents of teenage drivers can relate to this
feeling: the younger driver never experienced the consequence of
inattention and cannot calibrate the potential harm of bad driving
requests that routinely are processed by agencies, such as veterans asking for
benefits or social security recipients filing for retirement; those are not truly
requesting information, but the informational record retrieval is counted as a FOIA
request although it is part of the benefit transaction.
8. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989); Cooper Cameron Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
280 F.3d 539, 547-48 (5th Cir. 2002).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1-9) (2004).
10. Doherty v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 775 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985).
11. The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) complaints about
abuses by the Eisenhower administration are addressed in O'Reilly, supra note 6,
§ 2:2.
12. On rare occasions, Congress has selected recipient classes and denied
access to others, e.g., a supporting file underlying the decision to license a new
pesticide is accessible by United States firms but not by non-United States firms or
their agents. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(g) (2004) , added by Pub. L. 95-396, 92 Stat. 831
(1978).
13.
14.

Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3050 (1996).
Id., adopting 5 U.S.C. § 552(0(2) (2004).
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habits. For example, the Clean Air Act of 1990 required analysis of
the potential consequences of release of extremely hazardous
chemicals. 5 The EPA thought it would help more people by
requiring these to be posted on the Internet. 16 Opponents of secrecy
did not accept the assertions that someone reading this Internet
posting might want to actually cause the release to happen-that
someone might want to sabotage a plant and spread a cloud of poison
just where the mandatory analysis documents said it would go. 7
We will never know if disclosure of a particular federal agency
file on the Internet will allow that file to be used for an attack against
the refinery, bridge, or other entity that is described in the file. We
cannot tell. By its open nature, the Internet cannot tell us who has
downloaded what records. In the old days, one could make an FOIA
request for the agency log of FOIA requests, so as to track
competitors' inquiries. That method of requesting and tracking was
quaint, obsolete, and archaic; for today, the concept of "Internet data
mining" of Internet files for competitive intelligence is taught quite
openly around the world.
We heard during that pre-Internet era the FOIA Fiction was that
citizens would benignly volunteer to make the requests and use the
law to hold government accountable for government managers'
Instead, government has been a rich source of
behaviors.
competitively valuable intelligence about competitive companies'
permits and applications, plant inspections, and formulations.
"Money talks and information walks" was the reality. In retrospect,
federal agency accountability through right-minded FOIA requests
by interested citizen-critics was a pleasant, obsolescent ambition
from forty years ago.
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS

It would be intriguing to see an update of the economists'
evaluations of FOIA that were performed two decades ago. 8 What
have we purchased for the eighty-two million dollars that the Justice
Department spent on FOIA last year, 9 or the hundreds of millions
devoted to FOIA in all of the agencies? You paid for at least one side
of the litigation in each of the cases brought under FOLA; when the
15.
16.

42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (1999).
40 C.F.R. § 1400 (RMP program).

17. Critics of nondisclosure argued vigorously for release. See S. Rep. 106-70,
at 11-12 (1999).

18. William Casey, et. al., Entrepreneurship, Productivity & The Freedom of
Information Act (1982).
19. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Annual Report on the Freedom of Information Act
2003, availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/annual-report/2003/03contents.htm.
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federal agency loses, the court may award attorneys fees for the
winning side,20 and it seems to do so in just under half the cases
where disclosures are made.21 So what did the taxpayers get for their
money? Since I started compiling my FOIA treatise in 1976, I have
endeavored to read and summarize every reported FOIA decision;
there have been a little over 5,000 decisions. 2 These 350 cases each
year remain an important subset of administrative law jurisprudence.
But have we seen the classic secrecy behaviors of bureaucrats
change? Not so much. Has FOIA been a "weapon of mass
instruction?" Not much. Some advocacy groups have embraced the
public benefits of dissemination of data and their Internet websites
are archives of embarrassing disclosures.
Websites like
bushsecrecy.org and ombwatch.org bravely reflect that mood of
positive benefit from FOIA accessible records.
The claim that paying for all this FOIA litigation is worthwhile,
because it changes bureaucratic behavior, has been another FOIA
Fiction. The majority of agencies seem to have gone on with
business as usual, with FOLA as a pesky occasional intrusion. The
claim that the creation of the FOIA's right to sue for access would
equalize the field and induce behavioral change has proven,
unfortunately, to be another of the FOLA Fictions. It was true in
1965, but as FOIA became institutionalized, the bureaucratic coping
mechanisms to deal with it have shielded the activities of the
bureaucracy from any real impacts on behavior.
In practice, the significant wealth transfer that occurs because of
FOIA does not help domestic productivity or the United States
balance of payments. The Washington search firm which has sold
FOIA research services since 1975 now prominently marks its billing
documents for payment "in United States dollars only." The net
outflow of useful, technological data from the Chinese government's
publicly accessible websites is hard to guess, since that government
tightly controls all aspects of the Internet. The amount of useful data
from the United States websites that has been downloaded in China
is probably in the millions of pages. The economists who predicted23
such wealth transfers from the FOIA in a book in 1983 were correct,
and would be even more correct since the Internet has accelerated the
competitive utilization of agency files.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
21. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 824 F.2d 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and cases reported in O'Reilly, supra
note 6, § 8:28.
22. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Information & Privacy, Freedom of
Information Case List (2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/preface.pdf.
23. Casey, supra note 18.
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The public's right to know anything anytime was an attractive
ideal in the past, but now it is seen as "So September 10th!" What
is the mood now after September 1lth, and what does disclosure
policy tell us about getting back to normal? I will offer five points
for consideration:
1. Congress has led the retreat from full disclosure.
2. Federal courts have retreated in their interpretations of the
breadth of exemptions in the disclosure statutes.
3. New postings of data are far more sensitive to misuse than
ever before.
4. Public health is an area in which less disclosure is likely to
occur.
5. The diminished public disclosure will make it difficult for
both the terrorist and the concerned citizen to monitor local
health issues.
Let me explain.
V. CONGRESS LED THE RETREAT

Congress has led the retreat from openness, though individual
members have awakened to the consequences of the issue and are
slowly speaking against the new requirements 24 with a kind of
"buyer's remorse" for a bad bargain. Specifically, the USA
PATRIOT legislation 25 added a new pair of reasons for not
disclosing agency records. The Act also impacted disclosure
policies in several minor ways.
The biggest change arose when Congress created a tailored
exemption to the FOIA for a class of private data or local
government planning data that could reflect vulnerability to terrorist
attacks. This is the "Critical Infrastructure Information" (CII)
exception to disclosure, created by section 214 of the Homeland
Security Act.2 6

The elements of protected CII information are stated in the
statute and closely followed in the Department of Homeland
Security rules, which were published in interim final rule form in
January 2003.27

The final rules were issued in February 2004.28

24. H.R. 3171, 10 8th Cong., 1s Sess. (2003) (20 cosponsors for repeal of
PATRIOT Act).
25. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
26. 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A).
27. 68 Fed. Reg. 4055 (Jan. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 31).
28. 6 C.F.R. § 29, adoptedas Final Rules, 69 Fed. Reg. 8073 (Feb. 20,2004).
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These include, under their protection, information voluntarily
submitted to a covered federal agency for its use regarding the
security of critical infrastructure and protected systems, analysis,
warning, interdependency study, recovery, reconstitution, or other
informational purpose.29

In literal text that statute includes as

"Critical Infrastructure Information" any information (1) not
customarily in the public domain, (2) related to the security of
critical infrastructure or protected systems, and (3) within an
enumerated broad category of types of records.3" Once these criteria
are met, then (4) the data recipient must be the Department of
Homeland Security, which is the only federal agency covered by this
provision; 31 (5) the agency must be acquiring the data for "use by
that agency" rather than for other purposes or for dissemination to
others; 32 (6) the document must be marked with the words specified
in the statute for such express claims of CII status; 33 and (7) the
submission must be voluntary, which is defined as "in the absence
of such agency's exercise of legal authority to compel access to or
submission of such information. 34 The implementing regulations
adhere closely to the statutory text.35

29. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 214, 116 Stat. 2135, 2152-55 (2002).
30. The statute, 6 U.S.C. §§ 131(3)(A), (B) and (C), requires that the
information must relate to one of the following:
(A) actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on,
compromise of, or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected
systems by either physical or computer-based attack or other similar
conduct (including the misuse of or unauthorized access to all types of
communications and data transmission systems) that violates Federal,
State, or local law, harms interstate commerce of the United States, or
threatens public health or safety;
(B) the ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to resist
such interference, compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned
or past assessment, projection, or estimate of the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure or a protected system, including security testing, risk
evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk audit; or
(C) any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical
infrastructure or protected systems, including repair, recovery,
reconstruction, insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such
interference, compromise, or incapacitation."
Id.
31. Id. § 131(2).
32. Id. § 133(a)(1)(A). If the Department of Homeland Security is merely the
conduit for the FBI, for example, the conditions are not satisfied.
33. Id. § 133(a)(2)(A) ("This information is voluntarily submitted to the
Federal Government in expectation of protection from disclosure as provided by the
provisions of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002.").
34. Id. § 131(7)(A).
35. 6 C.F.R. § 29.1 (2004).
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VI. PREEMPTING STATE DISCLOSURES
The new statute protecting CII also makes a dramatic and
preemptive change from past disclosure laws because it directly
blocks state and local disclosure laws. Access to government records
is a statutory, rather than a constitutional right,36 and both federal and
state governments had enacted disclosure laws with different sets of
protections. The federal FOIA has been interpreted by its 1962-65
founders 37 and its 1965-2002 judicial interpreters as applying only to
federal records.3 8
The disclosure laws of the state and federal governments
proceeded in parallel but different channels. State courts sometimes
accepted arguments against disclosure of a state agency's file that
was premised on a record's federally exempted status. But more
often, state courts required a state record to be covered by a state law
exemption if it was to be withheld. And at the state and local level,
disclosure of records by helpful clerical employees in small offices
has been the very casual norm, with few of the checkpoints that one
encounters in the processing of federal FOIA requests.
Section 214 of the Homeland Security Act,3 which created CII
as a protected category, expressly preempts state or local laws
allowing or requiring disclosure of items that are within this broadly
defined set of security data. Section 214 bars disclosure under state
and local FOIA statutes in the event that CII information is shared
with a state or local agency. 4° The industry proponents see
preemption as a necessary adjunct to the federal statutory purpose.
Many chemical safety and explosives control data filings are made to
both federal and state environmental agencies at the same time.4' A
terrorist's access anywhere is a loss to the security objectives. The
CII proponents would argue that attacks can only be avoided if the
unitary approach to preventing disclosure is maintained.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rules on CII
delegate the interpretation of the criteria to the private sector person
who has a direct economic incentive not to allow disclosure to
36. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1,15,98 S. Ct. 2588, 2597(plurality opinion)
(quoting Potter Stewart, Or Ofthe Press,26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1975)).
37. O'Reilly, supra note 6, § 2:3.

38. Smith v. Herriott, 967 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1992); Ferguson v. Alabama
Criminal Justice Information Center, 962 F. Supp. 1446 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
39. 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A) (2004).
40. Id. § 133(c). Records independently obtained by the state or local entity
under its own authority are not barred from disclosure by CII.
41. See, e.g., Congress preserving state powers to demand submission of
identical or greater volumes of chemical release risk data in 42 U.S.C. §
1104 1(a)(3) (2004).
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competitors, local environmental advocates, plaintiffs' counsel, and
potential attackers.42 Critics will question whether CII statutory
protection fully satisfies the requirements for coverage of Freedom
of Information Act exemption (b)(3)(B). It will be asserted that the
allocation of discretion about data coverage to the private data
submitter, rather than to the agency manager, is a fatal flaw in the
claim that the CII statute meets the FOIA (b)(3)(B) test. Opponents
will argue that a vagueness of the coverage, combined with FOIA's
explicitly pro-disclosure canons of interpretation, favors a finding
that the CII clause is inadequate as an FOIA exemption under section
(b)(3)(B) of FOIA.4 3 One cannot expect busy federal judges to take
the time to absorb these nuances. Many judges outside of
Washington remain unfamiliar with FOIA, and some of these could
side with the critics when reviewing the exemption claims de novo
and without deference to the agency interpretation of the exemption.'
The desire for protection is not ended if FOIA (b)(3)(B)
exemption does not apply. That status may not mean federal
disclosure is mandated. The defending agency might be able to claim
that the record was a commercial secret with potential competitive
harm that was required to be submitted, and thus was not
"voluntary." A voluntary submission under the CH statute45 does not
mean their submission was voluntary for purposes of FOIA
exemptions dealing with commercial records confidentiality. Here,
the fine points of statutory definitions will be crucial, for "voluntary"
is a term of art in the field of federal information disclosure.46
The CII law may be vulnerable on state law grounds. Of course,
if the state had power to get the same data and routinely compiled it,
the CII legislation does not apply to such independently obtained
records.4 7 But if it is argued that CII cannot be disclosed under a
state or city "open records" law, the state court challengers will
attack the preemption authority of the Homeland Security Act
provision.48 They may prevail under current Supreme Court
preemption jurisprudence if the express preemption assertions fail to

42. The Department's rules allow the submitter to make the determination of
applicability of CII status to its plans or records, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,484 (Apr. 15,

2003).

43. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(B) (2004).
44. See O'Reilly, supra note 6, § 8:12.
45. 6 U.S.C. § 133 (a)(7)(A) (2004).
46. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (voluntary status allows wider protections against
disclosure). See also, O'Reilly, supra note 6, §14:70, for subsequent cases.
47. 6 U.S.C. § 133(c) (2004).

48. Id. § 133(a)(1)(E).
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satisfy the Supremacy Clause 49 case law precedents." State plaintiffs
could assert their rights under existing state statutory access
provisions, including the express 'Rublic right to know" access rights
under systems in New Jersey' and other states. 52
Federal
constitutional law demonstrates a presumption against preemption,5 3
and Congress must be explicit in preempting a pre-existing state right
such as a state statute that granted state disclosure rights to records
required by a state. Since the statute excludes from CII records
which were "independently" acquired by the state or local agency and
thereby remain subject to state or local laws,54 courts will only reach
the constitutional preemption issue after determining the factual
history of the acquisition of the particular records. The first state
decision under this provision rejected a claim of CIH status and
declined to treat location of cell phone towers as being confidential.5 5
The Achilles heel of the new CII system is the local government
clerical employee.
The federal department may be slow in
communicating to the tens of thousands of local offices that hold
diagrams of dams, plans of refineries, lists of explosive storage sites,
etc., that these offices are now barred from making their very routine
disclosures under procedures that these employees have followed for
decades. The private owner of the infrastructure information will
have to engage in self-help, perhaps by requesting the local entities
to change their disclosure practices. But this role is not mandated in
the statute or in the regulations and would be a counter-intuitive
action for a factory manager who needs to get along compatibly with
the local zoning or buildings department.
VII. DELEGATING THE SHIELD POWER

Another weakness of the statute is its placement of the
operational choice for CII into the hands of the private entity. A
private firm can make a submission that triggers CII status or can
undo the protective treatment with a selective written consent to

49. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. See, generally, the Commerce Clause-Supremacy Clause conflicts in U.S.
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
51. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:5A-1-31(1984).
52. See James T. O'Reilly, Technology and Trade Secrets, 21 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 64 (1990).
53. The best treatment of this issue is in Joseph Zimmerman, Federal
Preemption: The Silent Revolution (1991).
54. 6 U.S.C. § 133(c) (2004).
55. Maine Public Utilities Comm'n, Order on Waiver, Dkt. 2001-284 (May 7,
2003).
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dissemination.56 The private entity gets to decide what it will treat as
CII, and the department's rules state that it will accept the private
choice.57
A commentary on CII history is necessary for background. The
CII provision was one of several additions to the drafts of the
Homeland Security Act as it was rapidly developed in 2001.8 The
FBI took as its drafting model the text of the compromise legislation
adopted in 1999 for the shielding of certain maps of potentially
dangerous chemical releases. 59 That legislation was sought by
factory and refinery owners who feared that public dissemination of
maps of the scenario of a "worst case" chemical leak, 6° under an EPA
Clean Air Act 6' program, would broadcast the best ways for attackers
to release such a cloud from a targeted factory. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which controls both public power
generating entities as well as the private energy industries, adopted
a comparable CII program in 2003. FERC proposed to expand it to
shield data that FERC rules required to be made available by
companies directly to the public. But when compared with CII, the62
FERC's Order 630 had a more. narrow coverage of infrastructure
and a more narrow withholding in its rules on posting of
infrastructure information.63
VIII. IMPLEMENTING THE WILL OF CONGRESS

The Department of Homeland Security rules to implement this
CII provision of the Act virtually track the text of the statute. DHS
will rely on the discretion of the submitter as to whether the
volunteered information meets the statutory definition. 64 There is no
discretion to reject a claim, so there will be little or no base for
56. 6 U.S.C. § 133 (a)(l)(C) and (E)(ii) (2004).
57. 68 Fed. Reg. 18,484 (Apr. 15, 2003).
58. A fascinating unofficial narrative description of the statute's political
backing is found in Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September
12 Era (2003).

59. Pub. L. No. 106-40, 113 Stat. 207 (1999). See also S. Rep. No. 106-70
(1999).
60. Risk Management Plans containing such maps had been required by EPA
rules. 40 C.F.R. § 68.25 (2004). See Stephen Gidiere and Jason Forrester,
BalancingHomelandSecurity and Freedomof Information, 16 Nat. Resources &
Env't. 139, 144 (2002); James T. O'Reilly, Access to Records versus Axis of Evil,

12 Kansas J. Law & Pub. Policy 559 (2003).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (1999).
62.

18 C.F.R. § 388.113(c)(1) (2004).

63. 68 Fed. Reg. 9,857 (March 3, 2003) (making final the proposal from 67
Fed. Reg. 57,994 (Sept. 13, 2002)).
64.

68 Fed. Reg. 18,523 (Apr. 15, 2003), amending 6 C.F.R. § 29 (2004).
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judicial deference if a challenger asserts that the decision to withhold
CII in a particular case is arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. The
issues of federal agency abdication of such a significant adjudicatory
decision to an interested private party will be addressed in future
litigation.
The process starts with the filing at the Department of Homeland
Security of a piece of data that falls within the statutorily defined set
of such information. If it is marked with the express claim of CII
status, which is the trigger for confidentiality, that filing grants
certain protections to the data or records against any public disclosure
by any level of government.65
IX. CONGRESS ALSO SERVES "SUSHI"

Congress established an additional withholding category of
"sensitive" but unclassified data.' One statutory change is called
"sensitive homeland security information." This undefined set of
records, nicknamed "SUSHI," is a new category not quite the same
as classified military secrets, which have been exempt from FOIA
disclosure since the beginning. The rules for this category are
expected to be announced soon by the Department of Homeland
Security, under powers delegated by the Homeland Security Act.
The information sharing provisions of the Homeland Security Act
require the agencies to develop procedures by which they "identify
and safeguard homeland security information that is sensitive but
unclassified," and also share such information as appropriate for
homeland security purposes.6 7 An Executive Order may be issued to
require agencies to safeguard sensitive homeland security
information.68 In a February 18, 2004 letter,69 the Department of
Homeland Security told an FOIA requester that no procedures have
yet been finalized to implement this provision-section 892 of the
Homeland Security Act. The Nuclear Regulatory commission is
using this SUSHI approach to withhold submissions by licensed
nuclear plants.7"
65. 6 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2004).
66. Id. §§ 481-83, adoptedin Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135 (2001).
67. Id. §§ 892(a)(1)(A) and (B) (2004).
68.

See, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Information & Privacy, FOIA Post

(2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/mainpage.htm.
69. Letter from Elizabeth Withnell, Acting Dep't Disclosure Officer, Dep't of
Homeland Security, to Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists (Feb.
18, 2004).
70. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Regulatory Guidance, 69 Fed. Reg. 40681,
40687 (July 6, 2004).
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X. THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO SHRINKS DATA FLOWS

There are other indicators of the ways in which 9/11 changed
moods. Automatic declassification of older records has been delayed
several times. Executive Order 12,958 substantially altered the process
for declassifying relatively old documents.7 ' Records that were more
than twenty-five years old, and have been determined to have permanent
historical value, would have been automatically declassified whether or
not the records have been reviewed. In 1999, however, President
Clinton extended the time period for automatic declassification until
October 17, 2001.72 Before that deadline arrived, however, President
George W. Bush further amended Executive Order 12,958 to extend the
automatic declassification date until December 31, 2006.7 1 So if the
record was from 1979 and was a State Department cable related to
terrorism, it remains classified today.
The 1996 FOIA amendments have been implemented with very
little controversy up to this point.74 These "E-FOIA Amendments"
required the federal agencies to make "records created on or after
November 1, 1996 . .
available, including by computer
telecommunications. 7 5 Agencies already had a duty under the
Paperwork Reduction Act's mandate to provide "timely and equitable
access to the [data]
underlying [public information] maintained in
'7
electronic format. 1
As the White House directed, the Administration since 9/11 has been
more careful about posting material. The Justice Department also has
been instructing agencies to be more attentive to the terrorist utility of
new postings.7 Congress has led the retreat from the open FOIA with
these statutory changes, but the follow-up work has been done by the
Administration.
XI. THE COURTS ALSO RETREAT INTO DEFERENTIAL ACCEPTANCE
As Congress and the Administration have been moving, so
federal courts have retreated in their interpretations of the statutes.
71.

See, e.g., Exec. Order. No. 12,958,69 Fed. Reg. 19,825 §§ 3.3(e) and 3.6

(Apr. 17, 1995).

72. See Exec. Order No. 13,142, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,089 § 1 (Nov. 23, 1999).
73. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 69 Fed. Reg. 66,089 §3.3(a) (Mar. 25, 2003).
See also Primorac v. CIA, 277 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C., 2003).
74. But see contract disputes after the new statute, addressed in Information
HandlingServs., Inc. v. Defense Automated PrintingServs., 338 F.3d 1024 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).

75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2004).
76. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(d)(1)(B) (2004).

77. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Information & Privacy, FOIA Post:
Guidance on Homeland Security Information Issued (2002), at http://www.
usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost 10.htm.
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There is substantial deference already given to agencies; I estimate that
agencies have won ninety percent of litigated FOIA cases on summary
judgment motions based on agency affidavits about the documents being
withheld.
We see indications after 9/11 that the FBI and CIA receive greater
deference than before, when they decline to disclose records because of
national security or homeland defense issues. The few courts that have
mentioned this factor are too small in number to make a valid estimate
of a trend, but I have not seen courts apply the critical assessment that
they had previously applied to law enforcement affidavits in domestic
investigatory files cases.
A future law review study should
retrospectively examine the D.C. District Court judges' receptivity to
agency secrecy claims in summary judgment motions before and after
9/11.
XII. FARMING OUT THE SECRETS To EVADE FOIA DISCLOSURE
The CII protections and exemptions from the Freedom of
Information Act do not apply to information that stays outside the
federal government since there is no FOIA obligation upon non-federal
entities that hold information. If private sector data about a facility is
submitted to agents that are doing government's work but are outside
government, then the information remains beyond the reach of FOIA
disclosure. Agencies involved with the nation's infrastructure are far
more sensitive to the misuse of records than they have ever been before.
The power generation infrastructure is very vulnerable to attack and its
companies are right to be concerned. To avoid FOIA disclosure entirely,
the government is now funding the private coalitions known as ISACs,
the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers. The private coalition
ISACs were created by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63;78
President Clinton accepted the suggestion of the Oklahoma City
bombing study commission to create and use ISACs as a means to
combat the increasing vulnerability of our nation's infrastructure.7 9

78. Presidential Decision Directive 63/NSC 63 (1998), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pddlpdd-63.htm [hereinafter PDD 63] (The Clinton
Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protections).
79. President Clinton appointed a Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Exec. Order No. 13,010,61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 17, 1996), to analyze
and assess the vulnerabilities of and threats to our nation's critical infrastructure.
Id. These critical infrastructures included "telecommunications, electrical power
systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation,

water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and
rescue), and continuity of government." Id. Further, the Order acknowledged that
these threats came in the form of physical, electronic, radio-frequency, or computerbased threats. Id. Moreover, the President called for public and private sector
efforts to develop strategies for protecting and assuring the continued operation of
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Following 9/11, in Executive Order 13,231, President Bush extended and
amplified PDD 63.80

PDD 63 envisioned a federally supported national structure for
the coordinated partnership of public and private entities in an effort
to protect critical infrastructure. 8 Before the Department of
Homeland Security was created, ISACs reported to the National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism, who was tasked with implementing the Directive.8 2 PDD
63 directed the Coordinator to encourage owners and operators of the
nation's critical infrastructure to develop ISACs. 83 The information
was to flow into the National Information Protection Center (NIPC),
which was created to oversee these ISACs for both governmental
agencies and private entities." The Directorate for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection of the Department of
Homeland Security has assumed the role of the former NIPC.8"
Information sharing poses a risk for many private entities because
of the disclosure mandates in federal and state disclosure laws, such
as the FOIA. Private industry was concerned that maps and audits of
its vulnerability to attack might be required to be released by the
NIPC. This was the situation when nuclear plant vulnerability was
studied by industry self-audits and access to those audits was hotly
contested in the litigation that led to the CriticalMass decision in
1992;86 a decision favoring confidentiality arrangements.
The establishment of various industry specific sector ISACs was
a direct response to these desires for non-disclosure of data
concerning vulnerabilities. 87 Each sector's ISAC allows private
entities to share security information without governmental
disclosure of the data. The fourteen ISACs are each directed by its
membership; the common mission is to gather, analyze, and
disseminate to its members a comprehensive view of vulnerabilities,
threats, and incidents relevant to the ISAC sponsoring sector's
physical and cyber infrastructure.88 As a result, the information
which comes to ISACs will be used to provide warnings, establish
the infrastructures. Id. at 37,348.
80. Exec. Order No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,063 (Oct. 18, 2001).
81. PDD 63, supra note 78, at Annex A.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The current organization and duties of this Directorate are described at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic. The Directorate uses SUSHI to shield its meetings
from public view. See Notice of Meeting, 69 Fed. Reg. 54299 (Sept. 8, 2004).
86. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
87. PDD 63, supra note 78.
88. Id.
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trends (in terms of type and severity), and share threats and solutions
among the ISAC membership and the Department of Homeland
Security. ISACs are also a mechanism for sharing recommended
security practices and solutions among the members. PDD 63
recommended that eight sectors form ISACs, and it partnered each of
them with a corresponding lead agency of the federal government.89
ISAC formation started slowly after PDD 63. The market
competitors were hesitant to share internal information. However,
since 9/11 and the creation of DHS, the original eight ISACs have
been further redefined into fourteen sectors, and many have been
realigned with new agencies.9" Additional sectors, Public Health and
Public Transportation, are also currently being developed. 9'
XIII. PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATION IMPACTED BY THE POST-9/1 1
SHRINKAGE

Public health is an area in which less disclosure is likely to occur
after 9/11 for several reasons. First, the weaknesses of hospital and
health care organizations in dealing with bioterrorism will be
surveyed by the ISAC for public health, and the results will be
reported to states and the federal agencies such as the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Homeland
Security. But that vulnerability report will never be public since it
will be held within the ISAC. Any "critical infrastructure" data will
be exempt from FOIA requests if it were to be shared with federal
89. These eight sectors were defined and aligned as follows: 1) the Commerce
Department, for information and communications; 2) the Treasury Department, for
banking and finance; 3) the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), for the
water supply industry; 4) the Transportation Department, for aviation, highways,
mass transit, pipeline, rail, and maritime; 5) the Justice Department, for emergency
law enforcement services; 6) the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for
emergency fire service and continuity of government services; 7) the Department
of Health and Social Services, for public health services; and 8) the Energy
Department, for electric power generation and distribution and oil and gas
production and storage. Id.
90. The fourteen current federally recognized ISACs and their lead agency
include: 1) Transportation, DHS; 2) Financial Services, the Treasury Department;
3) Information Technology, DHS; 4) Telecommunications, DHS; 5) Energy (oil and
gas), Energy Department; 6) Electricity, Energy Department; 7) Chemical, EPA;
8) Water, EPA; 9) Food and Agriculture, Agriculture Department and Department
of Health and Human Services; 10) State Government, DHS; 11) Emergency Fire
Services, DHS; 12) Emergency Law Enforcement, DHS; 13) Real Estate, DHS; and
14) Research and Education Network, NASA.
91. The Public Health ISAC will be overseen by the Department of Health and
Human Services. The Coast Guard fostered creation of the maritime sector ISAC
with a detailed agenda featuring confidentiality of data. See Notice of Meeting, 69
Fed. Reg. 51097 (Aug. 17, 2004).
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agencies, because it is covered by section 214 of the Homeland
Security Act.92 The actual reports might never even reach the
department, if the ISAC for public health is created as has been
expected. The ISAC would ordinarily hold the data, and it would
never become a federal "record" for FOIA purposes. 93
Major changes in disclosure of personal medical histories and
individual health records have occurred in the past several years. The
implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) 94 by exhaustive federal regulations95 has
stopped the flow of health disclosures dramatically. The Privacy
Act and FOIA97 already restricted the dissemination of health
records as a voluntary choice of the federal agencies. Now, since so
many hundreds of thousands of healthcare workers have been forced
to sit through HIPAA training, "leaks" are far less likely to occur.
Public access to anthrax preparedness information for Detroit, for
example, would be far less likely to be made public; it might be held
by the healthcare ISAC, or withheld as CII under its FOIA exemption
as discussed above, or withheld as SUSHI, or if individual anthrax
poisoning had occurred, might also be withheld under FOIA
exemption (b)(6),98 or by operation of the HIPAA prohibitions.99
Overall, it is far less likely that healthcare data will be accessible to
the general public.
XIV. IMPACTS ON HEALTH SYSTEMS ACCOUNTABILiTY

A fifth issue is the diminished public disclosure concerning
healthcare system risks. This erosion of external information will
make it difficult for the journalist, the terrorist, or the individual
person to monitor the performance of defensive strategies to reduce
risks relating to anthrax, bioterrorism, or local health issues arguably
related to homeland defense.
The receptivity of the public to a loss of disclosure is the most
difficult aspect to quantify. If ninety-nine point nine percent of
Americans have not made FOIA requests for records, is FOIA access
capability still important to them? By analogy, an Associated Press
story in March 2004 reported that nearly sixty percent of Americans
92.
93.
would
94.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2004).
As a private record, it is not accessible under FOIA as an "agency record"
be. Id. § 552(a)(3).
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).

95.

45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2004).

96.
97.
98.
99.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2004).
Id. § 552(b)(6).
Id. This exemption shields medical privacy information.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2004).
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surveyed said that "government should have access to personal
information that companies collect about consumers if there is any
chance it will help prevent terrorism."'" The public is making a
tradeoff of the lesser of two evils-more secrecy for more defense.
As an elected official talking to my city's voters about their concerns,
I perceive that people are less sensitive to privacy issues since 9/11,
though it will take years of research and retrospective evaluation to
quantify what appears to be a change in the public's perceptions and
expectations. The lessened expectation of privacy during our post9/11 years has the potential to affect the way we think about openness
and government information in the future.
XV. STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE

We aspire to be an open society, even in the face of terrorism, and
disputes will inevitably arise about what is being withheld and why.
Currently disputes can be litigated, but federal court lawsuits are
expensive, cumbersome, and take a long time to resolve on the
crowded dockets of our district courts. Congress had once given
FOIA cases special status to advance them ahead of other cases, but
that provision was repealed in 1984.0 We need to have a dispute
resolution function that works in a timely manner. The remedy
selected in 1963 Senate drafts of what became the FOIA was a
federal district court civil action for injunctive relief,"°2 with de novo
judicial reviewl° 3and in-camera inspection of the records by the
judge."° This produced yet another FOIA Fiction: courts would
scrutinize agency decisions in detail. The reality is that agencies win
on the basis of affidavits that are rarely specific and rarely revealing,
and judges decline to use their power of in-camera review of the
actual documents except in rare cases. Courts have not been very
receptive to FOIA cases outside the very busy District of Columbia;
the average United States district judge rarely sees FOIA and defers
to agency affidavits on eighty-five percent of the cases. So if you are
negotiating for a release with an agency, you do not have an easy
time.
Ideally, the FOIA dispute needs an alternative remedy with
credibility, speed, clout, and results. This alternative dispute
resolution project would mean administratively centralizing the
power to override an agency's withholding decision. For example,
100.
101.
402(2),
102.
103.
104.

TerrorDevelopments Tuesday,Cincinnati Enquirer, Mar. 31, 2004, at A5.
Former 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D), revoked by Pub. L. 98-620, Title IV, §
98 Stat. 3357 (1984).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2004).
Id.
Id.
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if the Coast Guard declined to reveal the safety status of a barge
terminal handling liquid propane, the denial could be sent to a
disclosure monitor or ombudsman who would have the final say on
whether the record should be released. Ideally this official would be
in the National Archives and Records Administration rather than in
the Justice Department, and would have sufficient staff and legal
authority to do the job.
Canada has functioned quite well with this model since 1983.105
Several states have experimented; the FOIA Commission in
Connecticut"° has been a model adjudicator of access disputes.
New York has had a specialized Committee on Open Government
for intra-governmental appellate review of withholding for many
years. 10 7 My impression is that the investment has yielded great
benefits at the state levels. The idea is not new at the federal level,
having been studied by the Administrative Conference in the
1980s."°8 Such a neutral and dispassionate disclosure monitor
outside the agency should be available at the federal level, in lieu of
the current statutory appeal only within the agency. This alternative
dispute resolution could perhaps begin with homeland security and
defense records disputes.
The potential administrative appeals role of the disclosure
monitor at the National Archives and Records Administration is a
compromise between the inadequacies of the court review process
and the genuine need for protection of the sensitive agency records
that would harm the national interest if disclosed. The Justice
Department had operated such a system in the 1970s, functioning
like the Solicitor General does in deciding internally which agency
withholding would be deemed justifiable, and refusing to defend in
court agency FOIA withholding that was not well justified. That
system was centered at the Justice Department's FOIA office; but,
by contrast, a new monitor would be located at the National
Archives and Records Administration, outside of the Justice
Department to avoid the inherent conflicts that would otherwise
exist in litigation preparation and implementation. Such a monitor
role in an administrative appellate system would be far cheaper and
faster than district court litigation. Its independence would also
make it superior to the zig-zag changes that have occurred in Justice
Department disclosure policies. Those policies have been altered in
105. Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. A-I, available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/A-1/index.
106. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-206(b) (2004).
107. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89(4)(a) (1993).
108. Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom ofInformationAct Dispute Resolution, 40
Admin. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
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each of the past four changes of Administrations, calling for more
secrecy under Republicans" ° and a presumption of disclosure under
Democratic administrations.110
Before a non-court intermediary could resolve records secrecy
disputes and override agency withholding, the FOIA administrative
appeals step" would have to be amended, or the Administration
would have to create this gatekeeper as designee of the head of the
agency by an Executive Order that binds each executive branch
agency.
Such a new system would require several key pieces of
supporting data to justify its establishment:
1. The development of expertise of the adjudicator in FOIA
and in the subject matters that come before the new
office;
2. The development of trust and confidence in quality of the
reviewing officials' ability and impartiality; and
3. The avoidance of backlogs (FOIA time delays already are
tremendous,11 2 disregarding the statutory 10/20 day
norms," 3 so referrals to this adjudicator should not drag
out for a longer time, compared to the current system).
XVI. CONCLUSION

Getting "back to normal" with an open disclosure attitude will
take years, if it ever occurs. We can predict that Congress will stay
the course and not revisit this balance, unless its leadership can be
convinced about the need to change. The attitude of Congress toward
reform legislation is driven by the desire for preservation of power
and attraction of campaign money. Those forces will assure that
information policy will see no real changes, until financial or political
pressures produce a better atmosphere for change. So, the key
decisional committees of the Congress are NOThearing the opinions
of the general public resonating with concern on the government
109. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy, FOIA Post: New
Attorney General FOIA Memorandum Issued, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm.
110. See, e.g., OMB Watch, at www.ombwatch.org.
111. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(I) (2004) ("[H]ead of the agency" would be replaced
by a description of the new monitor.).
112. Actual and average times for processing of FOIA requests are required to
be reported in each federal agency's annual report on FOIA operations; for
example, the median time of processing at the Food and Drug Administration was
44 days. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Annual Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) Report (2003), availableat http://www.fda.gov/foi/annual2003.html.
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2004).
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secrecy issues. There is no groundswell of opposition to the set of
tradeoffs this article has discussed. Congress should not be expected
to roll back the more secretive policies instituted by the Homeland
Security Act.
In this climate we should not anticipate that statutory
modifications will be made to define greater access rights, or even to
institute a streamlined adjudicatory system to resolve access disputes
more rapidly. Successful requests for FOIA access will remain
difficult and perhaps unattainably complex for the average citizen.
The vast majority of voters are not FOIA users, and they would be
likely to passively accept the narrowing of FOIA access if it were
said to be done in order to enhance assurance that the recipients of
the federal file data could not use it to plan attacks against the United
States. So, will America get "back to normal" for information
policy? Probably not for the next decade; we should not waste the
remainder of this decade waiting for those golden years of openness
to reappear.

